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Executive Summary  
Background Elements on the Political Mobilisation of Minorities in France 
French political life is relatively immune to ethnic demands and claims for group rights, should they 
come from immigrant or native minorities (such as regional minorities or the Roma community from 
France). Article 1 of the 1958 constitution reads that the French Republic “shall ensure the equality of 
all citizens before the law regardless of their origin, race or religion” and this has been generally 
understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious belonging. This is 
regarded as opposed to the civic understanding of French citizenship that guarantees a vertical 
relationship between the state and the citizen. Any political claim articulated in ethnic or religious 
terms is considered favouring the pursuit of particular interests over general interest.  
Moreover, non-nationals do not hold political rights (to the notable exception of European citizens 
who can vote in local and European elections since 1992) and cannot participate formally to political 
life. As for immigrants who acquired French nationality and French people of immigrant descent, they 
hold political rights but surveys have demonstrated their low participation and lack of presence in 
French political life. 
However, there has been a tradition of immigrants’ mobilization in organisations since the post war 
period that can be seen as instances where to study the articulation of ethnic interests. France counts 
numerous immigrant associations that have learned to articulate their claim and negotiate their identity 
in Republican terms. In this process, the state has played a significant role in channelling the 
articulation of their claim. By drawing a line in between what could be considered as a reasonable 
claim from a minority group and what was regarded as leaning towards a separatist claim that would 
contradict Republican universalism, public institutions and policy makers greatly impacted the 
expression of minority interests. Activists have learned to navigate French political life and 
articulate their claim in Republican terms. 
The Focus of the Study on Minority Claims of Laïcité 
The mobilisation of associations defending the interest of Muslim community in terms of laïcité is an 
instance of the adaptation of minority group to Republican universalism.  
Laïcité is the French understanding of secularism that ensures the strict separation of church and 
states, and confines religious expressions to private matters. It is considered as a Republican value. 
However, the discussion of laïcité has been repetitively used to respond to the perceived increase 
of religious diversity in France, and more specifically to the challenge of Islam. This was the case 
in 2004 when a law recalling the principle of laïcité banned the wearing of the Islamic veil in French 
public school
1
. This was also the case in 2011 when Interior Minister Eric Besson decided to launch 
what he called an “Official Debate on Islam “and that the debate was quickly relabelled an “Official 
Debate on Laïcité”.  
In response to this, minority organisations such as immigrant based associations or Muslim 
organisations, stroke back with a mobilisation in “defence of laïcité”. They argued that the 
governmental use of the principle was a distortion of its original meaning and was not protective of 
religious freedom.  For instance, a collective of associations –including Muslim associations – 
gathered on 2 April 2011 to demonstrate against the governmental “Official Debate on Laïcité”. It is 
                                                     
1
 Law 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 controlling the wearing of religious signs and clothes in primary, secondary and 
highschools. 
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interesting to note that minority activists chose not to oppose laïcité but rather to reclaim laïcité and 
therefore articulate their demand in Republican terms.  
Minority claims of laïcité pertain to claims for equal treatment and tolerance. However, from a 
research point of view, investigating minority claims of laïcité, as such, appears as a valuable 
angle to discuss the state of tolerance in French political life. First, the direct link of this principle 
with notions of equality and tolerance allows for a direct entry into a value discourse that is not as 
easily discussed otherwise. Second, the frequent use of the term in link with Islam is a convenient 
topic to announce when contacting interviewees while the issue of religious diversity or tolerance to 
Muslim identity could be seen as infringing Republican correctness (namely the neutrality of the 
public space where religious expressions are not to be discussed).  
Methodology 
The case study on minority claims of laïcité consisted in a literature review, a press review, a 
collection of secondary sources on the issue and material collected during fieldwork.  
The fieldwork consisted in the attendance to meetings organised in reaction to the governmental 
decisions regarding laïcité (demonstrations and public meetings) and a selection of interviews (n=7). 
Interviews were conducted with activists of different organisations in an effort to keep an equal 
repartition in terms of gender, origin and religious belonging.  
The organisations were selected so as to keep a balance in between old organisations mobilised on 
the issue of laïcité and new organisations (organisations that are specifically mobilised against the 
passing of restrictive laws pertaining to laïcité; organisations whose mobilisation on the issue of laïcité 
is part of a larger objective to defend Islam and French people associated with the Muslim faith). 
However, the mobilisation involves few people and some activists participate in several of these 
organisations, which explain the limited number of interviews.  
Interviewees were asked about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if they saw laïcité as a 
necessary frame to articulate any minority-related claim in the French context, and if this was the case, 
what other options they would see. We paid attention not to impose the frame of laïcité on the 
interviewee and interviews also dealt with resources of mobilisation and individuals’ understanding of 
issues pertaining to diversity. The point was not to define laïcité but to analyse its use to articulate 
claims with respect to the acceptance of religious diversity in French political life. 
Main findings 
1. Minority organisations that are mobilised on the issue of Muslim discrimination and anti-Islam 
discourse articulate their claim for equal treatment in terms of laïcité to make themselves 
heard in the French context. Although Muslim people in general may be reluctant to adopt the 
notion of laïcité (perceived as anti-religious and also systematically used by the media to condemn 
their practices), Muslim activists identify laïcité as a French tradition and use it to render their 
mobilisation compatible with French political life. 
Beyond the strategic use of the term laïcité to articulate a claim in Republican terms, minority 
organisations are reclaiming laïcité and participating in a larger discussion on the definition 
of the notion and its link with the fundamental value of religious freedom.  
2. In this discussion, they are joined by majority organisations such as human rights associations 
and feminist groups. 
How did this happen? In fact, the initial framing of the first headscarf affair of 1989 was essential 
in linking the issue of Islam with laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was interpreted as 
a sign of religious extremism and women oppression, which prompted the mobilisation of 
organisations mobilised on the defence of laïcité and feminists, respectively. However, with the 
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growing stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws restricting the 
practice of Islam, some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their position to rally 
with Muslim organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité.  
3. French feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex. Most French feminists support a 
restrictive interpretation of laïcité because they interpret the wearing of an Islamic veil as a sign of 
discrimination against women. Only a limited number of feminist activists contest the 
manipulation of a discourse on laïcité to discriminate Muslim women and situate the issue at 
the intersection of gender and racial discrimination. 
4. By rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations have 
contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the specificity of 
a Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France. 
As such, minority claims of laïcité also qualify for claims of acceptance and recognition of 
Islam in France. 
Concluding remarks 
By focusing on the mobilisation in the defence of Muslim rights in France, the case study 
encompasses a limited number of activists. It allows analysing the implications of a mobilisation in 
terms of laïcité for individuals who distinguished themselves from the rest of the population by their 
religious belonging (real or perceived). However, this should not overshadow the restrictive turn in 
the interpretation of laïcité in the current French discourse and the fact that both right-wing and 
left-wing parties tend to follow this path. The change in positioning that we observed among a number 
of activists of the Human rights league and eminent specialists on laïcité such as Jean Baubérot, could 
inaugurate a broader change in discourse. However, the politicisation of the issue of laïcité in reaction 
to the Muslim presence is pervasive and appears as the most favoured strategy by politicians right 
now. 
Policy recommendations 
 Policy makers should pay more attention to NGOs and organisations that are organised on the 
defence of Muslim rights in France.  
 It is necessary to raise the awareness of French citizens on the issue of religious 
discrimination.  Because the public expression of religious identity is seen as illegitimate in 
France, there is a tendency to justify or downplay the importance of religious discrimination. 
Keywords 
Political Mobilisation, Minority, Discrimination, Muslim organisations, Laïcité, Feminism 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Main Political Challenges in Relation with Immigrants and Migration-Related Diversity 
French political life is relatively immune to ethnic demands and claims for group rights, should they 
come from immigrant or native minorities (such as regional minorities or the Roma community from 
France). Article 1 of the 1958 constitution reads that the French Republic “shall ensure the equality of 
all citizens before the law regardless of their origin, race or religion” and this has been generally 
understood as invalidating any mobilisation on the basis of ethnic or religious belonging. This is 
regarded as opposed to the civic understanding of French citizenship that guarantees a vertical 
relationship between the state and the citizen. Any political claim articulated in ethnic or religious 
terms is considered favouring the pursuit of particular interests over general interest. 
Moreover, the French political model excludes non-nationals from participating to political life. 
Nationality and citizenship are compounded and access to political rights is conditional on the 
acquisition of French nationality. Foreigners can acquire French citizenship after a five years’ 
residence, but naturalisation is not granted automatically to those requesting it: 70 to 80 per cent of 
requests are granted and the average wait is 18 months. In 2005, 40% of the 5 million foreign-born 
living in France were French citizens (INSEE 2006). The administration expects applicants to fulfil 
assimilation criteria such as knowledge of French language, stable financial resources and current 
residence in France, along with loyalty and sharing republican values. These rules leave major 
discretion to administration employees and applicants can be the target of judgement as to whether 
their application is suitable or not
1
. Immigrants who have not been through the process of 
naturalisation have therefore no political rights and access to political decisions.
2
   
As for immigrants who acquired French nationality and French people of immigrant descent, 
they hold political rights but their presence and participation in political life is limited. Surveys 
demonstrated that registration rates
3
 among second generation immigrants are low in comparison with 
French people with no immigrant background, of the same group age (Richard 1998). This has had the 
consequence to convey the image that French people of immigrant descent are not interested in 
politics and has discouraged political parties to appeal to that type of electorate. As such, the low 
participation rate of French people of immigrant descent in political elections did not encourage 
political parties in addressing ethnic interests. Moreover, for those who embarked in a political career, 
their presence did not necessarily translate in the increased representation of minority interests in 
French political life. First, French political parties proved to be particularly reluctant in incorporating 
minority members and allowing them to reach leadership positions. In depth studies of the party 
system demonstrate the difficulty encountered by minority activists to be allowed to run for elections 
at local, and even more, at national level (Garbaye 2005, Geisser El Sum 2008). Second, should 
minority activists be elected at a representative position, the chances are limited that they would 
articulate any minority-specific claim, owing to the general disapproval towards the articulation of 
particular interests in politics. Therefore, the increased participation of minority activists in 
political representation might be encouraged as a sign that the population is accepting 
                                                     
1
 Starting January 2012, however, the administration is to ask the result of a language test administered by a certified institute 
according to Decree 2011-1265 of 11 Octobre 2011 (Decret relatif au niveau de connaissance de la langue française 
requis des postulants à la nationalité française). 
2
 Non-nationals have no voting rights to the exception of the right to vote in union elections. Arguably, this has encouraged 
the integration of immigrant in the labour movement. However, the low rate of unionisation in France and the fact that 
not all immigrants work in unionised jobs make it a limited venue to participate in political life. 
3
 Registration on voting list were compulsory up until 1997 when it became automatic (law of 10 november 1997). 
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representatives of minorities as regular member of the political body. However, it can hardly be seen 
as a way to increase the representation of minority interests. 
Finally, regarding the possibility that political candidates may address minority interests for electoral 
purposes (i.e. appealing to a specific electorate such as the Muslim vote or the Black vote), it would 
only be possible if statistics were available. Yet, voting results in France are broken down into age, sex 
and occupational activities, and not in ethnic group. Political parties have little visibility on voting 
behaviour among ethnic groups and few incentives to address their specific interests.  
Despite the difficulty to articulate ethnic claims in the French context, there has been a tradition of 
immigrants’ mobilization in organisations since the post war period that can be seen as instances 
where to study the articulation of ethnic interests, especially in their interaction with the institution. 
From 1929 until 1981, people who wanted to create an association and obtain an official status had to 
hold French nationality. However, this has not prevented immigrants to mobilise and defend their 
rights in the 1970s when immigration laws became more restrictive. French activists have also created 
associations in solidarity with immigrant workers and their families.
1
 What’s more, when the 
association right was extended to foreigners in 1981, numerous associations were created, that held 
cultural, social and political objectives. France, therefore, counts numerous immigrant associations 
that have learned to articulate their claim and negotiate their identity in Republican terms (Kastoryano 
2002).   
Conversely, the state contributed greatly in channelling the articulation of immigrant claims in the 
French context (Ireland 1994). Two years after the law passed that allowed foreigners to create their 
own associations, immigrant leaders were appointed to sit in the administrative council of the Social 
Action Fund that allocates the funding of most immigrant associations (1983). A consequence of this 
has been the co-option of immigrants in the functioning of the state: some immigrant associations’ 
leaders are granted the right to represent immigrant interests in a consultative body, without being 
given access to the political process. The practice of co-opting associations’ leaders or militant 
activists is often regarded as a way to neutralise groups that are perceived as a threat by giving them 
symbolic rewards. A recent example of this is the creation of a Council for the Citizenship of Parisian 
Foreigners in compensation for their absence of political rights in local elections: although the council 
is designed as a place for the discussion of all kinds of issues, it ends up being specifically dedicated to 
matters that concerns foreigners primarily (Escafré-Dublet, Simon 2009:14-15). In a way, one could 
argue that foreigners’ specific interests are addressed in such a Council. However, as a consultative 
body, the Foreigners Council has no effective power and the actual City Council can or cannot take 
into account their specific concern. It is the responsibility of the member of the Foreigners Council to 
articulate their demand in a way that the actual members of the City Council may follow up on it.  
In sum, an essential challenge of French political life, with respect to migration-related diversity, 
lays in the illegitimacy of articulating ethnic and/or religious claims. To the articulation of an 
ethnic claim, the French political model opposes the danger of national disunity and, to the articulation 
of a religious claim; it opposes the strict separation of religious and public matters anchored in the 
principle of laïcité. However, the adaptation of immigrant organisations to the Republican ethos 
led to the articulation of ethnic and religious demands in suitable terms for the institution. Has 
this been a way for immigrants and religious minority to have their claim accepted or just 
tolerated by the state? This will be the main theoretical question that we will address in this report 
with regard to the specific question of laïcité. 
The emergence of a debate on laïcité can be seen as a response to the perceived increase of religious 
diversity in France, and more specifically that of the Muslim community. To be sure, Muslims 
have been present in France for decades, not to mention that the French empire has ruled over 
                                                     
1
 For instance, the National Federation of the Associations in Solidarity with Immigrants (la Fédération nationale des 
associations de soutiens aux immigrés www.fasti.org)  
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numerous countries that had mainly Muslim populations (e.g. Algeria, the Moroccan and Tunisian 
protectorates, Mauritania and Senegal). However, the Muslim component of French religious diversity 
has raised greater attention since the first headscarf affair of 1989, when, for the first time, a head 
teacher invoked laïcité to exclude two schoolgirls wearing an Islamic veil. Since then, it has become a 
constant feature of French political debates.  
There are no official statistics that record religious affiliation in the French population. There can 
only be estimations of the number of Muslims in France. The figure of ‘6 million Muslims living in 
France’ announced by the Interior Ministry in 2010 should be considered with caution.1  It derives 
from the number of immigrants and their descendants who come from a country where Islam is the 
predominant religion (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and to a certain extent Senegal) and does 
not, necessarily, mean that 6 million people in France identify themselves as Muslim, or as belonging 
to a Muslim community. In fact, there is a low level of assertion of religious affiliation in France and 
only 59% of French people with North African, African and Turkish descent identify themselves as 
Muslim (Tiberj, Brouard 2006). Moreover, a recent survey showed that 11.8 million French people in 
between 18 and 50 year old identify themselves as Catholics, 2.1 million identify themselves as 
Muslims, 500 000 as Protestants, 150 000 as Buddhists and 125 000 as Jewish (Simon, Tiberj 
2010:124). The number of 4 million Muslim people in France appears therefore as a more reasonable 
estimate. 
The state’s response to the growing concern towards the presence of a Muslim community in France 
has been the institutionalisation of Islam with the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Cult 
(Conseil Français du Culte Musulman) in 2003
2
. The Council is elected by Mosque representatives 
from all over the country and is intended to regulate religious activities. Although it is sometimes 
regarded as an interlocutor between the French state and Muslim people in France, it is chiefly 
concerned with religious matters and cannot be considered as an official representation of the Muslim 
community. In its first election, French Interior Ministry at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, was concerned 
that the French Union of Islamic Organisations (Union des organisations islamiques de France, 
UOIF), which he considered close to more extremist movements, would be too largely represented in 
the Council. However, this was not the case and different organisations are represented in the Council.  
The practice to create an institutional body to regulate Muslim activities and have organisation leaders 
elected can be regarded as a way to co-opt religious elites in the institutional process and better control 
them. At the time of the creation of the French Council of the Muslim Cult, it was debated whether 
this was a way to include Islam on an equal footing with Judaism and Protestantism, which already 
had their own state-recognised organisations, or if this was an attempt by the government to tighten its 
control over Islam in France. The tension was in between an interpretation of the creation of the 
Council as a sign of acceptance of Islam as an equal religion (as Protestantism and Judaism) or as a 
sign that Muslims activities were disapproved and that the state had to control them. An analysis of the 
associations that are mobilised on the issue of laïcité and, more broadly, on the perception of Islam in 
France helps understand this tension and evaluate the state of acceptance of Islam as a component 
of French religious diversity. 
1.2 Debates on Laïcité and the Articulation of Minority Claims in the Republican Context 
The difficulty to articulate diversity-related claims is a challenge for the participation and the 
representation of minority interests in French political life. To explore this challenge, we look at the 
mobilisation of NGOs and activist groups, and their positioning on the specific issue of laïcité. It 
                                                     
1
 Ministry of the Interior, ‘La France compte entre cinq et six millions de musulmans’, Press release, 27 June 2010. 
2
 There is, however, a larger movement to institutionalise Islam in European countries should it be through top-down 
processes such as in the case of France and Spain or with a bottom-up approach such as in the case of the United 
Kingdom. 
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appears as a valuable angle of approach for two practical reasons. First, the direct link of this principle 
with notions of equality and tolerance allows for a straight entry into a value discourse that is not as 
easily discussed otherwise. Second, the frequent use of the term in link with Islam is a convenient 
topic to announce when contacting interviewees while the issue of religious diversity or tolerance to 
Muslim identity could be seen as infringing Republican correctness (namely the neutrality of the 
public space where religious expressions are not to be discussed).  
However, investigating claims of laïcité in the French context requires taking into account the long 
tradition of collective mobilisations in support of this idea. A number of organisations are 
particularly emblematic of this mobilisation such as the French education league or the Human Rights 
League in France. The French education league (La Ligue de l’enseignement) was created in 1866 to 
support education for all, free of religious belief. It was instrumental in passing the Education laws of 
1882 that made French schools compulsory, free and laïc. It is still a very active and central 
organisation in the field. Moreover, numerous organisations defend laïcité as part of their 
mobilisations for the freedom of expression and fight for equal treatment of individuals, such as the 
Human Right League (Ligue des droits de l’homme) or the Movement Against Racism and for 
People’s Friendship (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples). The Human 
Right League was created in 1898 and the Movement Against Racism was created in 1949, in the 
aftermaths of the Second World War. 
Since the first headscarf affair of 1989, these organisations have incorporated elements in link with 
Islam in their activities. For instance, together with the Human Rights League, the Education League 
created a specific commission entitled Islam and Laïcité in 1997, and the Movement Against Racism 
decided on the creation of a specific commission on anti-Islam racism in 2004. Moreover, minority 
organisations and anti-racist groups have also embarked in the mobilisation for laïcité and 
contested the increasing stigmatisation of Islam. SOS-racism, for instance, contended that laïcité had 
to be implemented but that the law might enhance anti-Muslim feelings (Rochefort 1989).  
In addition to these existing initiatives, new groups were formed to oppose the passing of the law 
such as A School For All (Une Ecole pour tou-te-s, 2003) the Collective against Islamophobia in 
France (Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, 2003), Words Are Important (Les mots sont 
importants, 1999). It is interesting to note that these new minority organisations have not necessarily 
opposed the principle of laïcité but have, rather, integrated it in their discourse. The same goes for 
faith-based organisations that were created before or after the law (Presence and Muslim Spirituality in 
1999 or the Women Muslim League created in 2005) and the official representation of the Muslim 
community.
1
 
We look at this diverse set of organisations and analyse their positioning on laïcité in response to the 
governmental activity on the issue (laws, debates, official declarations). 
Since the passing of the March 2004 law banning the conspicuous display of religious signs in French 
public schools, numerous events in French political life have maintained the debate on laïcité at the 
top of the political and media agenda. In 2007, the case of mother wearing veil accompanying 
school outings was brought up and the argument that laïcité had to be enforced was proposed. In 2010, 
the passing of a law that banned the wearing of full Islamic veil renewed the debate on laïcité. It 
should be noted that the argument of the law is a security one; the formal objective of the law is to 
prevent the covering of one’s face in the public space (law of October 2010). Nonetheless, the political 
and media debate that accompanied the passing of the law articulated elements pertaining to the 
enforcement of laïcité and the tolerance of religious signs pertaining to the Muslim faith. Eventually it 
                                                     
1
 The French Council of the Muslim Faith did not adopt any official position on the law due to its internal divisions: some 
organisations represented in the Council were in favour of the law (the Coordination of Turkish Muslims from France, 
the French federation of Islamic Associations from Africa, the Comoros and the Antilles, and the Parisian Great Mosque) 
while one was against the law (the French Union of Islamic Organisations). 
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resulted in the articulation of a renewed discussion on laïcité and, in April 2011, the French ministry 
of Interior launched an “official debate” on laïcité.1 
In all these circumstances, mobilisations took place that opposed what has been regarded as an 
increased stigmatisation of Islam. For instance, when the French ministry of Interior announced its 
intention to launch a debate on laïcité, a collective of several imams (some represented in the French 
Council of the Muslim Faith) wrote an op-ed article in Le Monde and expressed their concern that the 
debate might prove that Islam is incompatible with Republican values, notably laïcité. They contended 
that “Muslim’s faithfulness to their religion do not prevent them from being fully committed to the 
principle of laïcité”2. Minority organisations gathered around the minority media Respect Mag and 
Saphir News to march against what they called a shameful debate on 2 April 2011. One flyer calling 
for the demonstration stated the organisation’s intention to “assert loud and clear [their] Republican 
and laïc beliefs”.3 
While minority organisations and official representations of the Muslim community in France 
have opposed the increasing restrictions on the display of religious signs, it is interesting to note that 
they have constantly, and increasingly, asserted their commitment to laïcité. This may stem from a 
need to adapt to the political and institutional structure of French society. However, we would like to 
analyse these discourses as claims for acceptance of Islam as a component of French religious 
diversity, on an equal footing with Protestantism and Judaism. 
Laïcité can be regarded as a notion that guarantees the toleration of religious diversity. However, when 
minority or religious organisations articulate their claim in terms of laïcité, they are not only asking 
for tolerance, they usually insist on the application of laïcité regardless of the religion at stake. In this 
paper, we demonstrate that the mobilisation with reference to laïcité is one that argues that Muslims 
are equal citizens who are suffering discrimination. Minority claims of laïcité can be understood as 
claims for equality and acceptance of Islam in France. 
2 Methodology 
The analysis draws on a literature review, a press review, a collection of secondary sources on the 
issue (reports published on line) and material collected during fieldwork.  
The fieldwork consisted in: 
• The attendance to meetings organised in reaction to the governmental decisions regarding 
laïcité: one demonstration in opposition to the debate on laïcité (Paris, April 2, 2011) and one public 
meeting organised by All Equal Moms (Mamans toutes égales) in reaction to the issuing of a law 
proposal to ban women wearing veils from all educational activities, including childcare at home 
(Bagnolet, Paris Region, February 9, 2012).  
• A selection of interviews (n= 7). Interviews were conducted with activists of different 
organisations in an effort to keep an equal repartition in terms of gender, origin and religious 
belonging (provided that the interviewee clearly articulated his or her religious belonging or absence 
of religious belonging).  
                                                     
1
 “Laïcité: trois heures de débat pour clore deux mois de polémiques” Le Monde, 5 April 2011. 
2
 “… la fidélité des musulmans à leur religion ne les empêche pas d’être pleinement attachés au principe de la laïcité ” 
(Abdelkrim F., Eddouk A., Gaci A., Kechat L., Miktar A., Minta M., Najah M., Oubrou T., Sahri R., “Islam, le débat de 
trop”, Le Monde, 4 March 2011) 
3
 « …nous tenons à réaffirmer haut et fort nos convictions républicaines et laïques », Etudiants Musulmans de France – 
Grenoble, Non au débat-procès de l’Islam [Retrieved 4 July 2011]. 
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The organisations were selected so as to keep a balance in between old organisations mobilised on the 
issue of laïcité (n=2: interview with two members of the Human Rights League) and new 
organisations (n=5). Among these new organisations, one should distinguish the ones that are 
specifically mobilised against the passing of, what they interpret as, more restrictive laws on laïcité 
(n=2 : Words are important and All Equal Moms) and the organisations whose mobilisation on the 
issue of laïcité is part of a larger objective to defend Islam and French people associated with the 
Muslim faith (n=3 : Council Against Racism and Islamophobia, Collective against Islamophobia in 
France and Presence and Muslim Spirituality).  
Organisations were selected so that to have a representation of each kind of organisation mobilised on 
the issue. They all share a common commitment to the principle of laïcité although for some it is part 
of a larger project to defend human rights (e.g. the Human Rights Leagues) or Muslim people in 
France (e.g. the Committee against Racism and Islamophobia in France) or Muslim women (e.g. All 
Equal Mothers)
 
.
1
  The rather limited number of interviews (n=7) comes from the fact that the 
mobilisation involve few people and after a few interviews we noticed that some activists were 
common to several organisations and could speak for the positioning of each.  
Interviewees were asked about their understanding of laïcité as a value and if they saw laïcité as a 
necessary frame to articulate any minority-related claim in the French context, and if this was the case, 
what other options they would see.
2
 As mentioned earlier, the idea to focus the interview on the 
notion of laïcité was a convenient angle of approach to speak about the place of Islam in France in a 
context where religious matters are not easily discussed. Moreover, owing to the current debate on the 
notion of laïcité and the fact that its meaning is constantly debated, it offered a direct entry into a value 
discourse that pertains to equality and tolerance, in general. We paid attention not to impose the frame 
of laïcité on interviewees but rather to take it as a point of discussion. Interviews also dealt more 
broadly on their mobilisation, resource of mobilisation and understanding of issues pertaining to 
diversity in the French context, in general.  
Interviews were analysed using discourse analysis with the aim to identify interpretative frames for 
claim making. The concept of laïcité was left as an open concept to be filled with varied meanings to 
highlight the different points of view of the actors and their different interpretation of what is the 
problem: is a mobilisation in defence of laïcité a way to defend Equality? Muslim rights? Religious 
freedom? Women rights? As argued by Verloo: “normative assessment criteria with all their 
ideological and political implications , are not absolute models of reference fixed once and for all, but 
rather open to periodical revision  and transformation in order to better adapt to the variegated nature 
of policy texts and to the changes in researchers’ theoretical perspectives” (Verloo 2007:38). In this 
fieldwork the point was not to define laïcité but to analyse its use in political claim-making with 
respect to religious diversity. 
The data collected during this fieldwork are relevant to compare with other minority organisations 
mobilised on the specific issue of accepting Islam as a regular religion in other European countries. 
Despite a wide range of context specific issues such as the strict separation of religious matter from 
the public life and the fact that religion is not regarded as a legitimate basis of mobilisation, the 
various issues that activists address are articulated in response to the discrimination of Muslim people, 
which is observed in other countries. Moreover, some of the activists who we met are in touch with 
other organisations in Belgium, the UK and Austria, which shows that they believe there are some 
commonalities in their experience (e.g. the network around the Cordoba Initiative
3
).  
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 See Annex for a List of the organisations we interviewed in this case study. 
2
 See Annexe for an Interview Guide 
3
 (www.cordobainitiative.org) 
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3 Case Study: Minority Claims of Laïcité in the Republican Context 
- “At first I thought laïcité was something antireligious, atheist, and then, after the first 
headscarf affair, in the 1990s, I met with these organisations that defend laïcité - the Human 
Right League, the Education League - and I understood that it was something to protect, it 
was an idea that defended the freedom of religion.” 1   
In this case study, we analyse how minority organisations, and especially minority organisations 
who are mobilised on the defence of the rights of Muslim people in France, adopted the notion of 
laïcité, for which reasons and with which implications. In these few words by a political activist who 
has long been mobilised on the defence of minority rights – specifically French people of North-
African descent – and who choose to articulate a Muslim identity as a political activist (he was the 
founder of Muslim Youth Union in 1986), one can clearly understand that this was not an obvious 
choice to make. And yet, a quick look at the websites of most of the organisations that identify 
themselves as defending the interests of French people of Muslim origin today show their intention to 
display their commitment to the principle of laïcité
2
. How did this happen and what are the 
implications for the defence of minority interests?  
First, we trace the mobilisation of organisations on the issue of laïcité starting from the first headscarf 
affair of 1989 to the latest mobilisation in defence of women wearing veils in educational activities. 
We clarify the positioning of several organisations (human rights associations, minority associations 
and feminist associations) so as to highlight the emerging consensus on the defence of laïcité that we 
could observe among minority associations. Second, we analyse minority associations’ commitment to 
laïcité. In particular, we discuss whether the articulation of their claim in terms of laïcité tends to put a 
strain on the defence of their interest or if this provides a useful space for the rise of a Muslim 
identity in France. We argue that the mobilisation for the defence of laïcité is understood by the 
actors as a claim for equality and a call to be accepted as equal in the face of a political discourse 
perceived as intolerant towards Islam. 
3.1  The Emergence of a Minority-Specific Mobilisation on Laïcité   
In this part, we present the main organisations mobilised on the issue of laïcité in link with Islam at 
three crucial moments: the first headscarf affair of 1989, the passing of the law banning the 
conspicuous display of religious signs in school in 2004 and the approval by the Senate of a law 
proposal to extend the application of laïcité to childcare (and thus, prevent women wearing an Islamic 
veil to work as nanny in their own house) in January 2012.We show that minority organisations went 
from being rather absent from the mobilisation to occupy the forefront of the debate, as the use of the 
principle of laïcité became more evidently a tool to reject Islam and exclude Muslim people. 
3.1.1 Majority organisations mobilised on the issue of laïcité and the 1989 headscarf affair  
At the time of the first headscarf affair in 1989, majority organisations mobilised on the defence of 
laïcité, were the most vocal on the issue
3
. When a school principal of a secondary school in Creil 
(North of Paris) excluded three young girls who wore an Islamic veil on the ground that they infringed 
the principle of laïcité, the first local associations to condemn the exclusion at the local level were the 
local representations of the Human Rights League, the Movement Against Racism and the Parent 
                                                     
1
 Interview with A.C., 27 January 2012, Collectif Against Racism and Islamophobia, former founder of Muslim Youth 
Union. 
2
  See the list of associations and their websites in Annexe. 
3
 By « majority » organisation we refer to organisations that comprise people from the majority population as opposed to the 
minority population under scrutiny in this case study, i.e. Muslim people 
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Association FCPE, an association founded in 1947, known as left-wing and strongly attached to the 
defence of laïcité
1
. The local Women Rights Centre also condemned the exclusion.  
However, the issue went from being a local event to stir a national debate on the wearing of the veil by 
girls going to French public schools
2
. The position of groups mobilised on the issue of laïcité or the 
defence of women’s right quickly evolved to oppose the wearing of the veil by school girls on the 
ground that it was infringing the principle of laïcité and the Islamic veil was an expression of religious 
extremism and a sign of women oppression.    
The reading of the issue that emerged at the time of the first headscarf affair proved essential: it 
inaugurated a new articulation in between the laïc point of view that opposes all religious 
extremists and the feminist imperative to fight women oppression (Rochefort 2002). One can 
observe the articulation of a counter position based on the idea that all religions have to be tolerated 
and that the exclusion of some is a threat to social cohesion, but it was highly criticised
3
. Among 
feminists, a few raised a concern that it might be patronising to think of the Islamic veil as a sign of 
oppression and the western understanding of women liberation as the right one (Boons-Graffé, Colin 
1989). But this positioning was minor in comparison with most French feminists – and among them, 
notorious figures such as Elisabeth Badinter and Gisele Halimi – who opposed the wearing of the 
Islamic veil
4
.  
Minority organisations such as immigrant associations were less vocal on the issue. One can 
observe the mobilisation of the Nana beurs collective composed of women of North-African descent, 
but they opposed the wearing of the Islamic veil by young girls on the ground that it was a symbol of 
oppression. At the time, the opposition to the veil was not interpreted as a rejection of Islam, but rather 
as a rejection of an extremist form of Islam.  
This is further illustrated by the fact that the most visible mobilisation on the part of the Muslim 
community was a demonstration on 22 October 1989, organised by the Islamic organisation, Voices of 
Islam, which gathered only a few hundreds Muslim people in Parisian streets. The media coverage 
highlighted that the demonstrators were extremists and foreigners (naming them by their country of 
origin: Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon and most notably, not the country of origins of most immigrants in 
France such as Algeria or Morocco)
5
. Journalists also pointed at the participation of Mohamed 
Mouhajer as leader in the demonstration. An Iranian activist, Mouhajer had earlier been linked to a 
series of planned terrorist attacks in 1986 (Bigo 2002). The demonstration was not perceived as 
representing the voice of Muslim people from France and accredited the argument that schoolgirls 
wearing veil were being manipulated by groups of extremist Muslims. 
Furthermore, minority organisations were very limited to be mobilised on the ground of their religious 
affiliation at the time and there was no such thing as a Muslim voice, or a Muslim representation, to 
articulate a specific claim on the issue. The difficulty to mobilise on a Muslim identity in the French 
1980s is reflected in the words of an activist who founded a Muslim Youth Union in 1986:  
                                                     
1
 Témoignage Chrétien, 30 Oct - 5 Nov. 1989. 
2
 Although the number of girls wearing a headscarf in schools has never been determined, it could be estimated to a few 
hundreds. In 2005, after the law was apssed and a report was issued by the governement, 300 cases of girls wearing a 
headscarf were signaled (Cherifi 2005) 
3
 See for instance the strong critique agains President’s wife, Danielle Mitterand who wrote: “If laïcité can not welcome all 
reigions and all expression in France, then we are moving backward” Le Monde, 22-23 October 1989. 
4
  “ Profs, ne capitulons pas!”, Elisabeth Badinter, Regis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Catherine 
Kintzler, Nouvel Observateur, 2-8 November 1989.   
5
 To see images of the demonstration: http://www.ina.fr/economie-et-societe/vie-sociale/video/CAB89044984/mohamed-
mouhajer.fr.html  
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- “When it came to give a name to our collective, we labelled it Muslim Youth Union. We could 
have used the M for Maghrebian [North African], this was much more accepted at the time, 
and we hesitated. But, we decided to be provocative and go all the way through it and have 
the M stands for Muslim. As a result I lost my job several years later; because my boss saw I 
had been part of some organisations that had the name Muslim in the title.”1  
In 1989, the wearing of an Islamic veil by some school girls was interpreted as a sign of extremism 
and its interdiction the best bulwark against fanaticism and women oppression. This translates in the 
mobilisation of the most active organisations on these issues: feminist movements and organisation 
that defend the enforcement of laïcité (Education League, Human Rights League and the parent 
association FCPE). Minority organisations were less represented in the debate. This was partly 
due to their lack of mobilisation on religious issues and the perception that the issue was limited 
to a few schoolgirls wearing veils.  
The first headscarf affair did not lead to the strict interdiction of the wearing of an Islamic veil in 
public schools, anyway. The State Council (Conseil d’Etat)2  then ruled that the wearing of the 
headscarf was “not contradictory to the values of the secular and republican school” and let it to the 
teachers and school directors to decide whether or not pupils were using this as an instrument of 
proselytism and disturbance of school activities.
3
 
3.1.2 Laïcité and its discontent: the mobilisation against the 2004 law banning the conspicuous 
display of religious signs in schools 
By contrast, the mobilisation to oppose the passing of the 2004 law banning the conspicuous display 
of religious signs in schools gathered a variety of new organisations and collectives.
4
 They had to 
confront the still ever pervasive argument that the Islamic veil is a sign of religious extremism and 
interviews with members of several of these organisations reveal the difficulty to mobilise on issues 
pertaining to Islam and laïcité. However, the networking around that period paved the way for 
further mobilisations for the defence of laïcité in the name of Muslim rights. 
The opposition to the passing of the 2004 law gathered around the collective A School For All (Une 
école pour tou-te-s) where members of various organisations met: majority organisations mobilised on 
the defence of laïcité such as the Human Right League or the parent association FCPE; feminists such 
as the Feminist Collective for Equality; anti-racist organisations such as the Movement against racism 
(MRAP); minority associations such as the Movement of Immigration and the Suburbs (MIB) and 
Muslim organisations such as Participation and Muslim Spirituality, to name only a few. What account 
for this change in positioning among majority organisations and for the mobilisation of Muslim 
organisations? 
3.1.2.1. Feminist groups 
Among feminist activists, there was a change in positioning because some of them felt there was a 
manipulation of a discourse on gender equality to discriminate Muslim women. However, this 
                                                     
1
 Interview with A.C., 27 January 2012, Collectif Against Racism and Islamophobia, former founder of Muslim Youth 
Union. 
2
 The State Counsil, (Conseil d’Etat) is the highest administrative authority in charge of advising the French governement. It 
is composed of 350 High Civil Servants, among which 80 can be assigned outside the State Counsil at high 
administrative positions.   
3
 State Council ruling of November 27, 1989.   
4
 LAW number 2004-228 of 15 March 2004 controlling the wearing of religious signs and clothes in primary, secondary and 
high schools. Article 1 (…) “In public schools (primary, secondary and high schools), the wearing of signs or clothes by 
which pupils signal conspicuously their religious belonging is forbidden 
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change did not happen easily, nor massively. Christine Delphy, a long-time feminist activist and 
theorist, was a founding member of a feminist collective that opposed the law
1
. She explained that it 
was a difficult position to hold and that few feminist activists followed.  
- “At the time, few feminist were against the law. In fact, I actually think there were more of 
them, but they were scared to say it. Many times some feminist activists came to talk to me 
telling me they agreed with me but did not want to say it…they should have, that would have 
helped me!”2 
It was difficult to oppose the law because this was generally interpreted by other feminist activists as 
agreeing to the oppression of women through the veil. The perception that Muslim women are victim 
of discrimination when the Islamic veil is criticised (or banned, for that matter) is often overshadowed 
by the conviction that the Islamic veil is an instrument of women oppression. It all happens as if the 
most important form of discrimination is that imposed by Islam on women, and not that of the French 
society on Muslim women.  
 
The difficulty to acknowledge the discriminatory dimension of a discourse opposing the Islamic veil 
can be interpreted as a general difficulty to apprehend issues of discrimination at the intersection of 
race and gender. As Duchen argued, the French feminist movement emerged from extreme left groups 
in the 1970s and activists were more used to articulate issues of gender and class, than issues of gender 
and race (as opposed to Second Wave Feminism in the US that emerged from the mobilisation of 
women activists in the Civil Rights movement, for instance) (Duchen 1986). Lepinard further 
demonstrated that the mobilisation of feminist groups for the equal representation of women and men 
in politics, in the 1990s, contributed to define white women’s interest as the interests of all women and 
to overlook the heterogeneity of the category of women. This had the further consequence to pit 
feminists against minority group rights and when issues related to the Islamic veil surfaced, French 
feminists supported the law banning the veil and “participated in racialising migrant women’s culture 
as well as perpetuating the colonial stereotype of Muslim women as victims to be protected” (Lepinard 
2007: 396).  Feminist positioning on the issue of laïcité is complex and a clear divide among French 
feminist groups.  
3.1.2.2. Human rights organisations 
For human rights organisations, what was perceived as a manipulation of the concept of laïcité to 
the detriment of a group of people (namely, French people of Muslim origin) and, in turn, to the 
general idea of individual freedom, was central to their change in position. A member of the 
commission specialised on laïcité in the Human Rights League and former school principal clarifies 
his change in position and subsequent opposition to the passing of the 2004 law: 
-  “In 1989, and later in 1994, I had understood that we had taken the wrong decision. Our 
decision was funded, sure, because it was not right that these girls wanted to wear a veil. 
However, we had wanted to apply a principle that usually applies to institutions, to 
individuals. So, the laws that we were applying were going contrary to the liberal principle 
of laïcité, they were restricting the freedom of and from religion”3  
3.1.2.3. Muslim organisations  
As for Muslim organisations, meeting with laïc organisations such as the Human Rights League or the 
Education League sensitized them to the benefit of the application of the principle of laïcité i.e. its 
                                                     
1
 Collectif féministe pour l’égalité 
2
 Interview with C.D., 13 february 2012, Paris, member of the All Equal Mother collective. 
3
 Interview with A.B., 10 february 2012, Paris, member of Human Rights League and the Commission Islam and Laïcité 
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value as a protection of religious freedom, and the possibility to articulate a claim in defence of their 
religious expression in the framework of laïcité. The collective A School for All encompassed 
activists from the Council of Muslim French, Participation and Muslim Spirituality, along with two 
other associations
1
. Moreover, since 2002, practising Muslims are represented through the French 
Council of the Muslim Cult. This official representation is contested, however, as following the 
governmental lines. Most likely, the existence of such an official representation of Islam in France 
prompted the formation of Islamic organisations that did not feel represented by such Council and 
meant to articulate a different point of view. 
To be sure, the reunion of activists from laïc and anti-racist organisations (mainly composed of white 
people), leftist and feminists organisations (composed of activists who, for some, felt deeply anti-
religious) and Muslim organisations (who felt that laïcité was something antireligious) was not an easy 
venture. Activists remembered having to put aside some of their preconceptions, should it be against 
religion or against laïcité
2
. However, the concept of laïcité proved to be useful to gather various 
organisational strengths and allowed to articulate a claim for equality and recognition of 
Muslim people in the French society. The Charter adopted by the collective A School for All states 
their commitment to laïcité
3
. As such, if the mobilisation against the law of 2004 failed in the sense 
that the law passed and has been enforced since then, the mobilisation proved successful in the sense 
that the network of activists could be reactivated later on, in the face of further developments 
regarding the application of laïcité in and around public schools. 
3.1.3 The mobilisation of Muslim organisations and the defence of laïcité  
With the restrictions applied to women wearing veils and a debate linking Islam to laïcité in France 
(cf. Timeline of recent decisions pertaining to laïcité below), any attempt in reaffirming the 
enforcement of laïcité has been interpreted as targeting Muslim people and lead to a mobilisation in 
reaction to it. By contrast with the first headscarf affair, when it appeared as a few cases of schoolgirls 
wearing a veil - who did not represent the majority of the Muslim community in France - there is now 
a concern that the whole Muslim community is under suspicion and that veiled women are but a 
pretext. To quote Ismahane Chouder, member of Participation and Muslim Spirituality, “They aim at 
Islam, but they hit women”4. 
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 Union de jeunes musulmans (UJM) et Etudiants musulmans de France (EMF). 
2
 Interview with C.D., member of a feminist collective, 13 February 2012; .interview with I.C., member of a Muslim 
organisation, 17 February 2012 
3
Charte des collectifs Une école pour tou-te-s/ Contre les lois d’exclusion, July 2004 (http://lmsi.net/Charte-des-collectifs-
Une-ecole ) 
4
 As quoted in the meeting of All Equal Moms (Mamans toutes égales) 9 february 2012, Bagnolet, France. 
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A closer look at the mobilisation in support of mother wearing veils helps understanding the 
current mobilisation of minority organisations in reaction to the debate on laïcité. After Education 
Minister Chatel opposed the participation of mother wearing veils in school outings the collective All 
Equal Moms was created and organised its first demonstration on May 2, 2011.
1
 It reactivated the 
network of activists mobilised against the 2004 law (laïc organisations, feminist organisations, 
minority organisations and Muslim organisations)
2
. The population under scrutiny, however, is 
different: mother wearing veils are not schoolgirls who could be suspected of being manipulated by 
their family
3
, some of them are taking a part in the mobilisation and are part of the collective All Equal 
Moms.  
When mother wearing veils justify their mobilisation, they underline the discrimination they think they 
are victim of (as opposed to the affirmation of a Muslim identity, for instance): 
- “I have three kids and they go to nursery and primary school. I am allowed to accompany the 
one in the nursery school but not the two in the primary school, because it is a different 
director who applies a different rule. When I asked why a mother who was wearing a 
Christian cross could accompany pupils in their activity outside school I was told this was not 
a religious sign in comparison with an Islamic veil. I refuse this discrimination.”4 
                                                     
1
 Demonstration of Monday 2 May 2011, in Montreuil, Paris Region “All Equal Moms: against the exclusion of mother 
wearing veils from school activities outside schools”.  
2
 A listserv encompassing 90 subscribers and an average of 30 people attending their weekly meetings. (Interview with I.C., 
member of the collective, 17 February 2012, Paris) 
3
 See the pervasiveness of this argument in the treatment of the first headscarf affair and afterwards. 
4
 Speech by Anissa Fathi, from Montreuil, Paris region, at a public meeting organised by All Equal Moms, 9 February 2012, 
Bagnolet, France. 
Timeline of decisions pertaining to the application of laïcité in France (2003-2012) 
 
-  July 2003: President Jacques Chirac appoints Bernard Stasi at the head of a Commission to reflect 
on the application of laïcité in France 
-  March 2004: Law Banning Religious Signs in Public Schools 
- October 2005: Cherfi report states that the law is well understood (Cherfi 2005) 
- March 2007: The case of mothers wearing veil taking part in school activities is brought up. The 
High Authority against Discrimination (the Halde) recommends to stick to the 2004 law that only 
applies to pupils and adds that it could qualify as discrimination on religious criteria 
- October 2010: Law banning the covering of one’s face in public space. The law aims at preventing 
the wearing of the full niqab but it is based on the principle of security in the public space and not the 
principle of laïcité.  
- March 2011: Education Minister Luc Chatel declares that parents taking part in school activities are 
associated with educational staff and are therefore obliged to follow the principle of neutrality in the 
public sector. He announces that a decree preventing mother wearing veils to take part in school 
activities will be passed (has not happened yet).  
- April 2011: Interior Minister Claude Guéant launches a debate on laïcité. 
- September 2011: Interior Minister Claude Guéant forbids the practice of praying in the streets under 
the justification that it goes against laïcité. 
- October 2011: Interior Minister Claude Guéant announces that a code on laïcité needs to be issued. 
- January 2012: Law proposal to prevent nanny wearing veils to exert at home or in a private 
institution is approved by the Senate 
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- “It’s hard for me to have my children understand that this society rejects me, hates me, and 
that their mother is illegal because she wears a veil”1 
According to Christine Delphy who joined the collective, it might be that for these women who are not 
working (hence their availability to accompany children in school activities), they are experiencing 
discrimination for the first time
2
, and to make it worst, are affected in their function as mothers. 
In the mobilisation in support of mother wearing veils, the argument that laïcité is diverted from its 
legal meaning and that it needs to be defended is central. The website of All Equal Moms features 
an informative document detailing what the law of 1905 defining laïcité “says and does not say”3. The 
meeting organised in February 2012 gathered members of laïc organisations such as the Human Rights 
League and a specialist on laïcité, Jean Baubérot, former member of the Stasi commission of 2003 and 
recent author of a book entitled Falsified Laïcité (La laïcité falsifiée, Baubérot 2012). Among the 
interventions, laïcité was often mentioned as distorted from its legal meaning and a concept to 
mobilise around: 
- “Laïcité tends to mean ‘no-religions’ but that is not what it means”4 
- “Laïcité is being confiscated; we should not let this happen”5 
- “Laïcité is used as a euphemism for a society that does not want Islam”6    
- “We need to appropriate ourselves the principle of laïcité as a principle of equality”7 
Arguably, the principle of laïcité corresponds to the common ground on which all these collectives 
can gather. Laïc organisations denounce the distortion of a fundamental value that is central to the 
preservation of individual freedom. Feminist denounces the manipulation of laïcité to oppress Muslim 
women. Muslim organisations denounce the use of the principle of laïcité to reject Islam. The 
principle of laïcité appears as a useful frame to articulate a claim in defence of Muslim people in 
France: it draws on the principle of equality that is central to the legislation, it defends religious 
freedom and it helps gather members of the majority population to the Muslim cause.  
 
The initial framing of the first headscarf affair was essential in linking the issue of Islam with 
laïcité and feminism. The wearing of the veil was interpreted as a sign of religious extremism and 
women oppression, which prompted the mobilisation of organisations mobilised on the defence of 
laïcité and feminists, respectively.  
However, with the growing stigmatisation of Islam and the systematic use of laïcité to pass laws 
restricting the practice of Islam, some defenders of laïcité and feminist activists shifted their 
position to rally with Muslim organisations and denounce an intolerant interpretation of laïcité. 
They have used the concept of laïcité to articulate a claim for respect and recognition of Islam in 
France. 
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 Speech by an elected representative of the parent association FCPE from Montreuil, Paris Region, at a public meeting 
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3.2 Mobilisations on Laïcité and the Articulation of Muslim Identity in France 
In this part we discuss the implication of a mobilisation in defence of laïcité for the articulation of 
Muslim interests and a Muslim identity in France. We show that the mobilisation of Muslim 
organisations was not likely, considering the general distrust of Muslim believers towards laïcité, but 
they found it a useful frame to articulate their demand in terms that are compatible with French 
political life. We argue that this has had the further consequence to highlight the commonality of their 
French experience as Muslims and that Muslim mobilisation can be regarded as a relevant venue for 
the articulation of a Muslim identity in France. 
3.2.1 Conflicted feelings towards laïcité 
Laïcité appears as something negative to the Muslim community in France with its use in the discourse 
to reject Muslim practices. It started with girls wearing veils in schools (forbidden by the law of 2004) 
and went on with mother wearing veils who want to take part in school activities (forbidden by some 
schools). But laïcité was also called upon when Claude Guéant threatened to forbid the praying of 
Muslims in the streets (a common practice when mosques are full on Fridays). This prompted 
numerous commentators to point that laïcité applies to the public space, in the sense that the public 
space means the space that the state rules (e.g. schools, administrations) but not just streets as Claude 
Guéant implied (Delphy 2011). As stated by a member of the Human Rights League who is not 
Muslim but organised meetings on the question of laïcité in the Northern region:  
- “Among people who are identified as Muslims in France, laïcité is considered as a word-trap. 
They do not see it positively.”1 
Moreover, there is a tendency to see laïcité as something anti-religious or atheist among Muslim 
people
2
. According to one Muslim activist who we interviewed, the reason for this preconception on 
laïcité comes from the use of the concept in Islamic countries such as Algeria and Tunisia. She 
confirmed that it is an obstacle when she addresses Muslim audiences in France.  
- “Because of the time that I spent with specialists on laïcité during the mobilisation against the 
passing of the 2004 law, I became a kind of specialist on laïcité among my organisation 
[Participation and Muslim Spirituality]. I find it hard to convince Muslim people that laïcité is 
not something anti-religious. I think it comes from countries in North Africa who used the 
principle of laïcité to fight against Islamist organisations, in Tunisia, and also in Algeria a 
lot…but we are talking about authoritarian regimes! Nonetheless, that is what people think, 
they think that laïcité is something opposed to Islam.”3 
As such, we may operate a distinction in between, on the one hand, members of Muslim 
organisations who may have sharpened their understanding of the philosophy of laïcité and use 
it to articulate a claim for equal treatment and recognition and, on the other hand, French 
people of Muslim faith who rest suspicious about laïcité. In this context, the current use of laïcité 
by governmental politics is to consolidate a general distrust. 
And yet, organisations who address Muslim people in France have adopted the principle of laïcité and 
thrive to assert their commitment to the law of 1905. Regarding the official representation of Muslim 
believers, the French Council for the Muslim Cult, it is no surprise that they claim their commitment 
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 Interview with G.V., 25 January 2012, Human Rights League, Paris. 
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 Cf. supra. “At first I thought laïcité was something anti-religious”, (Interview with A.C., 27 January 2012, Collectif Against 
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to laïcité as a state-created organisation
1
. When the French government announced the launching of a 
debate on Islam and laïcité in France, imams who are members of the regional representations of the 
Council for the Muslim Cult wrote an op-ed article published in Le Monde to reiterate their 
commitment to laïcité
 2
. It is more surprising to see less official organisations (and even organisations 
who oppose the French Council and present themselves as providing an alternative representation of 
Muslim people in France) adopt the principle of laïcité. The president of the French Council against 
Islamophobia explained: 
- “Laïcité is a strong belief and it is a principle that we base our mobilisation on. Laïcité is 
what protects Muslim and their freedom of religion. It is central to our mobilisation.”3 
This is indicating a process of frame alignment, when organisations are adapting their discourse to fit 
the political opportunity structure. Are Muslim organisations using the concept of laïcité strategically 
to make their claim easier to be listened to in the French context? 
3.2.2 Meeting standards of reasonableness in claim-making 
Activists involved in Muslim organisation clearly asserted that laïcité is a French value. In the 
interview guide, we asked interviewee whether they saw laïcité as a traditional, a national or a liberal 
concept. Although members of laïc organisations or feminist organisations identified laïcité mainly as 
a liberal value and, in doing so, clearly identified their involvement on the issue as part of a larger 
mobilisation for the advancement of liberal values, three members of Muslim organisations identified 
laïcité as a French concept. This can be interpreted as reflecting their idea that laïcité is a French value 
and mobilising on the defence of laïcité is a way to frame their claim in French terms. 
This observation supports the hypothesis of the political opportunity structure influencing the framing 
of minority claims and the argument of frame alignment. Frame alignment occurs when individual 
interpretations of the issue at stake concur into a general interpretative frame that match with the larger 
belief system (Snow 1986). The centrality of the notion of laïcité in the French value system makes it 
fitting for Muslim activists to articulate their claim along this line and secure support in the French 
social movement. As such, Muslim organisations adopt the discourse of the institution on laïcité to 
make themselves heard as Muslims in France.  
The imperative to rest in the limits of French institutions and French legal system is well 
reflected through the strategy adopted by the Collective against Islamophobia in France, which 
provides legal assistance for people who feel they were discriminated as Muslim. The collective was 
created in 2003 as an internet group to react to what was perceived as discrimination towards Islam in 
the media and later provided a legal assistance through a hotline. A legal advisor answers phone calls 
and the collective is also in touch with lawyers when discriminated people need to file a law suit 
against the offender. According to the legal assistant, in most of the cases they are able to provide the 
offended with mediation that helps solve the issue
4
. Numerous cases involve a woman who has been 
prevented from entering a school in the name of the 2004 law although it is a private school or an 
institution of higher education (the law only applies to primary, secondary and high public schools). 
She outlined that by helping fighting discrimination against Muslim people in France, the organisation 
stays “in the framework of the law”.  
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 The creation of the French Council of the Muslim Cult is the result of a top-down process initiated by Interior Minister 
Sarkozy in 2003. 
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The strategy to frame a claim according to a concept, such as laïcité, that is clearly identified as 
French, and in a manner that stays strictly in the framework of the law can be regarded, along with 
other claims made by Muslims in Europe, as thriving to meet standards of reasonableness (Meer 
2012). As such the mobilisation of Muslim people for the defence of their interests (namely the fight 
against discrimination) is operating in the framework of French politics and demonstrates their ability 
to adopt the standards of French political life.  
3.2.3 A raising Muslim consciousness 
Beyond the fight against islamophobia and the reassessment of a commitment to laïcité, we observe 
that organisations are thriving to maintain a network of associations nation-wide. The Collective 
against Islamophobia in France is connected to two reformist networks with regional branches: 
Participation and Muslim Spirituality and the French Muslim Council. Notably, the Collective is 
contacted by local Muslim representatives or associations or even a mosque, when someone reports 
discrimination. But, these contacts also help to network and gather strength when in a situation to 
prepare a mobilisation of Muslim people. As such, the Collective against Islamophobia in France 
launched an appeal to the presidential candidates and ask about their positioning on issues pertaining 
to Muslim people in France. It states:  
- “We aim to synthetize the expectations of Muslims in France in view of the Presidential 
Election and to transmit them to each candidate so that they position themselves clearly on the 
issue and allow all citizens to vote knowingly”1.  
In fact, attempts to appeal to Muslim votes were absent from the presidential campaign. President 
Sarkozy tried this strategy in the last presidential campaign of 2007 because a technical advisor had 
suggested that the Muslim electorate amounted to three millions and the right-wing majority would not 
be able to win the election without appealing to this electorate(Escafré-Dublet, Simon 2009: 9). 
Nicolas Sarkozy had positioned himself as a defender of an Islam of France with his efforts in creating 
the French Council of the Muslim Cult in 2003. Moreover, he sent positive signs to Muslim people in 
the year preceding the election, with the nomination of a “Muslim Prefet”, for instance. The strategy 
was different for the 2012 campaign. The government adopted a restrictive stance towards Muslim 
practices that was not sending positive signs to the Muslim electorate. The main opposition party, the 
Socialist Party did not address Muslim practices or a Muslim electorate, either. Mainly, the candidate, 
François Hollande, announced his will to anchor laïcité in the Constitution
2
. The relative neglect of the 
Muslim electorate could be explained by the fact that surveys demonstrated the strong commitment to 
left-wing parties of people who identify themselves as Muslims
3
. For right-wing parties, it is too hard 
an electorate to conquer and the anti-Muslim stance might be catching more votes among the majority 
electorate. As for the left-wing parties, they might consider that they can take this vote granted.  
The call of the Collective against Islamophobia might not be met by the concerns of the presidential 
candidates. However, the very fact that a collective is able to launch such a strategy and rely on the 
support of several Muslim organisations demonstrates the existence of a Muslim mobilisation in 
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France that offers a contrasting picture with the situation of 1989 when only a few foreign-based 
extremist organisations were able to gather demonstrators in the streets. One interviewee who is not a 
Muslim activists support this view: the emergence of a debate on laïcité and the way Muslim people 
react to the attack might be the opportunity for France to realise that believing in the vertical relation 
of the individual with the state is a fiction and that minorities do exist
1
. Arguably, not all Muslim 
organisations support this strategy and the Muslim community cannot be regarded as speaking with 
one voice; other Muslims activists denounced what they see as a separatist strategy when, in their 
view, Muslim mobilisation has to be articulated with other citizens’ concerns2. However, the very fact 
that these tensions exist demonstrates the vivacity of the mobilisation and supports the hypothesis of 
the emergence of a Muslim consciousness in France. 
3.3.4 What Muslim identity in Republican France? 
Will Muslim people who are discriminated as a group mobilise as a group? The common experience 
of discrimination in France might have built a sense of commonality among the Muslim community 
that may be able to surpass the factionalism of French Muslim community (Cesari 1994). The Muslim 
community is usually divided according to immigrants’ country of origin. The creation of the French 
Council of the Muslim Cult was symptomatic of these phenomena and all attempts to create a 
representation of Islam in France exhibit similar patterns.
3
 The creation of such an organisation as the 
Collective against Islamophobia in France is remarkable from this point of view; it departs from the 
usual group representation of Islam and gathers French people who experienced discrimination as 
Muslim (should it be when they applied for a job or because they could not register to a school). This 
fits the general movement towards the emergence of a Muslim individual in a post-migration 
society that Cesari identified: “First generation Islam, hampered by an uprooted sense of national 
identity and a weak organisation structure, is increasingly giving way to new forms of religiosity, 
characterised by individualism, secularism and privatization” (Cesari 2003: 259).  
By laying the emphasis on discrimination of people who are identified as Muslims, mobilisations in 
defence of islamophobia are able to draw on the individual experience of Muslim people in France and 
on how Islam is seen in France. Despite the framing of the issue in terms of laïcité, they identify 
clearly that the question of the presence of Islam in France is not only a question of religion. The fact 
that they lay the emphasis on the egalitarian dimension of laïcité is evidence that the issue is not 
just the protection of religious freedom but also the necessity to fight the unequal treatment of 
Muslim people, should they be believers or simply identified as Muslims by the majority population.
4
  
The discrimination of Muslim people in France is not only a question of religion but also part of a 
larger process of racial construction of Islam. The systematic attacks on Islam and the way they are 
able to be justified by a reference to the Republican principle of laïcité participates in a larger process 
of Othering that can be traced back to the colonial period (Amiraux 2010). As such, the collective All 
Equal Moms are preparing a mobilisation to bring the case of mother wearing veils to the United 
Nation in Geneva on the ground of racism and not religious intolerance. This strategy has been 
recommended to them by a lawyer and legal specialist of the United Nation as relevant in their case
5
. 
The objective is to prevent the law proposal of January 2012 to be passed in the months to come and 
this is one more instance of a mobilisation that adopts the argumentation of discrimination to gather 
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Muslim voices. The choice of race as opposed to religion in the building of a discrimination case 
might be justified by the fact that religion is not recognised as a ground for discrimination to the same 
extent as race. However, it is also a way to underline the racial construction of Islam in France and 
demonstrates the understanding of Muslim identity in France as shaped by its historical past. 
  
Despite the reluctance of Muslim people towards laïcité (perceived as anti-religious and also 
systematically used by the media to condemn their practices) Muslim organisations have found it a 
useful frame to articulate their claim in French terms and render their mobilisation compatible with 
French political life.  
What’s more, by rendering their mobilisation adapted to the French context, Muslim organisations 
have also contributed to the articulation of a Muslim consciousness. They are highlighting the 
specificity of the Muslim identity in France and the post-colonial construction of Islam in France. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
4.1 Analysing minority claims for laïcité in terms of tolerance, intolerance or respect 
The manipulation of the principle of laïcité for discriminatory purposes (against Muslims) tends to 
undermine the egalitarian dimension of laïcité. In response, human rights activists join Muslim 
organisations to defend the rights of Muslim people in France. They articulate their claim in terms of 
laïcité arguing that laïcité is, currently, distorted by some politicians, and that its liberal and egalitarian 
dimension is under threat. In doing so, minorities and their allies are articulating a claim that asks for 
the acceptance of Muslim people as equal.  
Moreover, the articulation of a minority claim in terms of laïcité helps anchor its demand in the French 
context. One could argue that the necessity to articulate a Muslim claim in terms of laïcité 
demonstrates that minority have integrated the intolerance of the majority towards minority claims. 
However, we could also observe that the framing of the demand in French terms helps underline the 
specificity of the Muslim experience in France and contribute to raising Muslim consciousness.  
Finally, intolerant practices that are manifest in discrimination appear as a valuable ground for the 
articulation of claims for acceptance. One interviewee pointed to the necessity of tolerance to open a 
dialogue (even if tolerance supposes that X disapprove of Y). However, the growing mobilisation in 
defence of Muslims’ right to be treated equally demonstrates that in the face of practices of 
intolerance, minority do not reply with a claim for tolerance but move on directly to a claim for 
acceptance. When discourses on laïcité are manipulated by politicians to criticise Islam, Muslim 
activists do not reply by asking to be able to practice their religion even if the majority population 
disapprove of it. Instead, they ask for the equal treatment of Islam as a minority religion in France 
(with Protestantism and Judaïsm). This may come from the fact that Muslim people who would ask to 
be able to express their religious belonging despite the disapproval of others could be considered as 
pursuing a separatist agenda. This would not be adapted to French Republican context. In other words, 
claims for toleration are invalid in the French context, while claims for acceptance are more adapted.  
However, the fact that individuals interpret intolerant discourse towards Muslims as discriminatory 
might also be crucial. Discrimination appears as a meaningful frame to articulate their concern: it is 
condemned by the legislation and is a legitimate basis of policy making (cf. the EU directive to 
combat discrimination of 2000 and the subsequent creation of a High authority to fight discriminations 
in France that existed from 2005 until 2010). What’s more, the notion of discrimination is deeply 
linked to that of equality: discrimination is defined by the distance between equality in principle and 
unequal treatment in practice. It then makes sense that if individuals interpret intolerant practices as 
instances of discrimination, they articulate their response in terms of equality and ask to be accepted as 
equals. The interpretative frame of discrimination is, therefore, key and since it is present in other 
countries, may have the same result elsewhere. 
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4.2 The small scope of the case study in comparison with the intolerant discourse towards 
Muslim people 
By focusing on the mobilisation in the defence of Muslim rights in France, we have voluntarily 
narrowed down our research scope to a limited number of activists. It helped us analysed the 
implications of a mobilisation in terms of laïcité for individuals who distinguished themselves from 
the rest of the population by their religious belonging (real or perceived). We could see that this has an 
impact in their identification as Muslim people in France. However, this should not overshadow the 
restrictive turn in the interpretation of laïcité in the current French discourse and the fact that 
both right-wing and left-wing parties tend to follow this path. The change in positioning that we 
observed among a number of activists of the Human rights league and eminent specialists on laïcité 
such as Jean Baubérot, could inaugurate a broader change in discourse. However, the politicisation of 
the issue of laïcité in reaction to the Muslim presence is pervasive and appears as the most favoured 
strategy by politicians right now. 
4.3 Recommendation to policy makers 
Policy makers should give more audience to NGOs and organisations that are organised on the 
defence of Muslim rights in France. It is necessary to sensitize the population on the issue of 
religious discrimination and the construction of racism on the basis of people’s religious 
belonging (real or perceived). A tendency to see the articulation of religious identities as illegitimate 
in France has contributed to undermine the understanding of discrimination on the basis of religion, or 
even, to justify discrimination on the ground that religious expressions are incompatible with French 
society. The initial interpretation of the first headscarf affair of 1989 is pervasive in this sense. Muslim 
people, and more specifically women wearing veils, are usually perceived as extremists and therefore 
incompatible with laïcité.  One interviewee who wears a veil explained that she had difficulty in 
identifying herself as laïc; so much so, that she has to argue and demonstrate at length the 
compatibility of laïcité with religious beliefs when she is in a situation of defending her position in a 
meeting
1
.  
4.4 Comparative perspective with European countries 
Minority organisations articulate their claim in terms of laïcité in an attempt to adapt their demand to 
French political life. However context-related their strategy is, it does allow for comparative 
perspective in the sense that all minority groups tend to articulate their claim in order to fit the political 
opportunity structure they are addressing. What is the impact of the national discourse on the 
neutrality of the state on the articulation of minority claim in other European countries? Is it a 
claim to be treated as equal in the face of what is perceived as an intolerant position of the majority 
population? Moreover, in this case study we analysed the opportunity of the re-articulation of Muslim 
identity in France. Can we see comparable situation in other post-migration countries with Muslim 
minority groups? 
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Annexes 
List of Organisations 
 
Associations Creation 
Criteria for mobilisation 
Laïcité Gender 
Discrimination 
against 
Muslim people 
Muslim 
Participation 
All Equal Moms 
Mamans toutes égales 
www.mamans-toutes-egales.com  
2011 X X X  
Collective Against 
Islamophobia in France  
Collectif contre 
l'Islamophobie en France 
http://islamophobie.net   
2003 X  X  
Coordination against 
racism and Islamophobia 
Coordination contre le 
racisme et l'Islamophobie 
www.crifrance.com    
2008 X  X X 
Human Right League  
Ligue des droits de l'homme 
www.ldh-france.org   
1898 X    
Muslim Participation and 
Spirituality 
Participation et spiritualité 
musulmane 
www.psm-enligne.org  
1999 X X  X 
Words Are Important 
Les mots sont importants 
http://lmsi.net/   
1998 X X   
 
List of interviews: 
1. 23 January 2012: one member of Human Rights League, also member of the commission on Islam 
and laïcité. 
2. 25 January 2012: President of Collective against Islamophobia in France 
3. 27 January 2012: Founder of Coordination against Racism and Islamophobia 
4. 10 February 2012: one member of Human Rights League, co-founder of the special commission on 
Islam and laïcité 
5. 13 February 2012: one member of All Equal Moms 
6. 14 February 2012: one member of Words Are Important 
7. 18 February 2012: member of Muslim Participation and Spirituality 
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Interview Guide 
- When do you talk about laïcité in your association? In which situations? 
- How do you understand laïcité? 
- According to you, laïcité is a traditional, liberal or national value? 
- Do you think that laïcité is about tolerance, intolerance or respect (…or equality)? 
- Do you frame your claim in terms of laïcité to make it compatible with French political life? What 
could be a different framing of your claim? 
- More broadly, do you think that your claims are compatible with French political life? 
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